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Deference to the Executive in the United States after 9/11:
Congress, the Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel
Eric A. Posner1
September 22, 2011

Abstract. The deference thesis is that Congress and the judiciary should defer to the
executive’s policy judgments during national emergencies. A recent criticism of the
deference theory draws on the analogy of the emergency room medical protocol to argue
that emergencies call for rule-bound constraint of the executive rather than deference to
it. However, this criticism rests on a misunderstanding of the tradeoff between rules and
standards. Some scholars who have despaired of congressional or judicial constraint of
the executive, but believe that some sort of constraint is desirable, have suggested that the
executive’s own legal adviser, the Office of Legal Counsel, could provide such a
constraint. In fact, OLC cannot plausibly be considered a constraint on the executive; its
function is the opposite—to expand rather than to contract executive power.

According to the “deference thesis,” legislatures, courts, and other government
institutions should defer to the executive’s policy decisions during national security
emergencies.2 In this paper, I will address two criticisms of the deference thesis. The first
argument, which has been developed most powerfully by Stephen Holmes, is that rules dominate
standards at moments of crisis.3 An executive that is unconstrained, that is, not bound by rules,
will make worse policy choices than an executive that is bound by rules. This type of argument is
usually made in the context of urging legislatures and courts to constrain the executive during
emergencies.4 Some commentators, however, doubt whether it is possible for legislatures and
courts to constrain the executive during emergencies. These doubts have led to a second
argument, which is that the executive should be bound by institutions within the executive
branch such as (in the United States) the Office of Legal Counsel,5 or through the construction of
new institutions that review the executive branch’s actions.6 Both arguments criticize the
deference thesis but propose different solutions. The first proposes that Congress and the
judiciary give the executive less deference; the second proposes that officials within the
executive branch give the president less deference. Thus, we can distinguish external constraints
on the executive and internal constraints on the president.
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I criticize both these arguments. The external-constraints argument gets the normal
analysis backwards: rules are better for routine, recurring situations. While some emergencies
are, in fact, routine, the type of emergency that calls for deference is not. The internal-constraints
argument, as normally presented, makes the fatal assumption that the president can be bound by
his own agents against his own perceived interest, and relies on other questionable premises
about the structure of government in the United States.
I. The Deference Thesis
The deference thesis states that during emergencies the legislature and judiciary should
defer to the executive. It assumes that the executive is controlled by the president, but to the
extent that the president could be bound by agents within the executive, the deference thesis also
holds that those agents should follow the president’s orders, not the other way around. In normal
times, the three branches of government share power. The president needs legislative approval in
order to take action. For example, if the executive believes that a new, dangerous drug has
become available, but possession of the drug is not yet illegal, the executive may not act on its
own to detain and prosecute those who deal and use the drug. It must first ask the legislature to
enact a statute that outlaws the drug. The executive also depends on the legislature for financial
appropriations and other forms of support. Once the executive obtains legislative authorization, it
still faces constraints from the courts. If the executive arrests dealers and seeks to imprison them,
they must first obtain the approval of courts. The courts will ensure that the executive does not
go beyond the bounds of the new law; does not violate other earlier enacted laws that have not
been superseded by the new law; and does not violate the Constitution.
In emergencies, the executive will often contemplate actions that do not have clear
legislative authority, and that may be constitutionally dubious. For example, after 9/11 the U.S.
government engaged in immigration sweeps, detained people without charges, used coercive
interrogation, and engaged in warrantless wiretapping of American citizens. Many if not all of
these actions would have been considered violations of the law and the U.S. Constitution if they
had been undertaken on 9/10 against normal criminal suspects. After 9/11, both the legislature
and the courts gave the executive some deference. The legislature later gave explicit authority to
the executive, which it initially lacked; the courts did not block actions that they would have
blocked during normal times. Neither body was entirely passive.7 Congress objected to coercive
interrogation and did not give the executive all the authorities that it requested. After a slow start,
the courts also resisted some of the claims made by the executive. There is some dispute about
whether this resistance was meaningful and caused the executive to change policy or merely
reacted to the same stimuli that caused the executive independently to moderate certain policies,8
but in any event no one disputes that the courts gave the executive a nearly free pass over at least
the first five to seven years of the conflict with Al Qaeda.
The deference thesis, then, can be strong-form or weak-form. This ambiguity has had
unfortunate consequences for debates about post-9/11 legal policies. Virtually no one believes
that the courts should impose exactly the same restrictions on the executive during an emergency
7
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as during normal times. Indeed, doctrine itself instructs courts to balance the security value of a
course of action and its cost to civil liberties, implying that certain actions may be legally
justified to counter high-stakes threats but not to counter low-stakes threats. Nor does anyone
believe that the executive should be completely unconstrained.
The debate can be best understood in the context of the U.S. government’s post-9/11
policies. Defenders of these policies frequently invoked the deference thesis—not so much as a
way of justifying any particular policy, but as a way of insisting that the executive should be
given the benefit of the doubt, at least in the short term. The deference thesis rests on basic
intuitions about institutional competence: that the executive can act more decisively and with
greater secrecy than Congress or the courts because it is a hierarchical body and commands
forces that are trained and experienced in countering security threats. The other branches lack
expertise, and although they may have good ideas from time to time, and are free to volunteer
them, the ability of the executive to respond to security threats would be unacceptably hampered
if Congress and the courts had the power to block it to any significant degree. Secrecy is an
important part of the argument. Policymaking depends on information, and information during
emergencies must often be kept secret. Congress and the courts are by nature and tradition open
bodies; if they were to act in secret, their value would be diminished. Meanwhile, the argument
continues, the fear of an out-of-control executive who would engage in abuses unless it was
constrained by the other branches is exaggerated. The president has strong electoral and other
political incentives to act in the public interest (at least, in the United States). For if the executive
can conceal various “inputs” into counterterrorism policy, it cannot conceal the “output”—the
existence, or not, of terrorist attacks that kill civilians.
Thus, it was possible for defenders of the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies
to express discomfort with certain policy choices, while arguing nonetheless that Congress and
the courts should not try to block executive policymaking for the duration of the emergency—at
least not as a matter of presumption. Critics of the Bush administration argued that deference was
not warranted—or at least not more than a limited amount of deference was warranted, although
again these subtleties were often lost in the debate—for a variety of reasons. I now turn to these
arguments.
II. External Constraints: The Protocol Analogy
A. Medical Protocols
In an article published a few years ago, Stephen Holmes uses the arresting image of the
medical protocol as a device for criticizing the deference thesis—or, more broadly, the thesis that
the executive should be “unconstrained” during emergencies. Holmes describes his own
experience in an emergency room, where his daughter had been brought with a serious injury:
At a crucial moment, two nurses rushed into her hospital room to prepare for a
transfusion. One clutched a plastic pouch of blood and the other held aloft my daughter's
medical chart. The first recited the words on the bag, “Type A blood,” and the other read
aloud from the file, “Alexa Holmes, Type A blood.” They then proceeded, following a
prepared and carefully rehearsed script to switch props and roles, the first nurse reading
3

from the dossier, “Alexa Holmes, Type A blood,” and the second reading from the bag,
“Type A blood.”9
To the layman, the repetitive actions of the nurses seem senseless: why are they repeating
themselves when the patient may die unless she receives the blood transfusion immediately?
Surely, the nurses should depart from the script rather than follow it in a time of extreme medical
urgency. Yet the protocol makes good sense. Experience has taught medical personnel that basic
errors—the transfusion of the wrong blood—occur frequently, and that they can be avoided
through the use of simple protocols. Although following the protocol uses valuable time, in
practice the increased risk to the patient as a result of the loss of time is less than the risk caused
by the errors that protocols are designed to prevent.
The larger and more striking point of the example is that, even during emergencies, when
the stakes are high and time is of the essence, agents should follow rules rather than improvise.
In this way, agents should be constrained. This argument has potentially radical implications.
Recall that the conventional objection to deference is that the risk of executive abuse exceeds the
benefits of giving the executive a free hand to counter Al Qaeda. Holmes argues—although at
times he hedges10—that in fact the benefits of giving him a free hand are zero: a constrained
executive, like a constrained medical technician, is more effective than an unconstrained
executive. If the benefits of lack of constraint are zero, then the deference thesis is clearly wrong:
constraints both prevent executive abuses such as violations of civil liberties and ensure that
counterterrorism policy is most effective.
B. Rules and Standards
The arresting medical protocol example helps clarify the tradeoffs involved, but for all
that it is merely an illustration of the familiar rules/standards tradeoff which has been a staple of
the legal literature for time immemorial. A rule is a norm that directs the decisionmaker to ignore
some relevant policy considerations when deciding on a course of action; a standard is a norm
that directs the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant policy considerations when
deciding on a course of action. The familiar example is the speed limit. A speed limit tells the
driver that he does not face a legal sanction if he drives below a certain speed, say, 60 miles per
hour, and that he does face a legal sanction if he exceeds the speed limit. A standard—for
example, “drive carefully”—tells the driver that he does not face a legal sanction if he drives
carefully, but that he does if he drives carelessly. The standard, unlike the rule, directs the driver
to take into account all relevant considerations—the weather, traffic congestion, his own skill
and experience, the responsiveness of his car, and so on—when deciding how to drive.
A driver who drives at 65 on a clear day on an empty, straight road, who is skilled and
experienced, poses little threat to anyone, and most people would regard his driving as careful, so
that under the standard he could not be held liable, while under a rule he would be. Meanwhile, a
driver who drives 60 miles per hour on a congested, dangerous road, at night, in bad weather,
who is inexperienced, would probably be regarded as careless, so that he would be held liable
under a standard but not under the rule. It is in the nature of standards that we cannot be sure that
9
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he would be held liable; it depends on the biases, intuitions, and experiences of the legal
decisionmaker. Thus, we say that applying standards involves high decision costs. And it is in
the nature of rules that we can easily tell whether the driver would be held liable or not, but only
because the legal decisionmaker is forced to ignore relevant moral and policy considerations that
otherwise complicate evaluation. Rules are under- and overinclusive; by design, they cause error.
These considerations lead to a basic rules-standards prescription.11 Use rules to govern
recurrent behavior, and use standards to govern unusual behavior. Experience teaches us that if
drivers obey certain rules (such as speed limits), the risk of accident is greatly reduced, while
judicious choice of (sometimes complex) rules ensures that error costs are low. When
legislatures enact new rules, they can invest a great deal of time and effort determining the
optimal rules, because the cost of the rules are then spread out over many instances of the
behavior that the legislatures seek to regulate. And yet rules frustrate us because there always
seems to be some new, unanticipated case where the application of rules leads to an injustice.
The speed limit rule should not apply to the parent who rushes a badly injured child to the
hospital. And there are many cases where rules can too easily be gamed. Tax rules, no matter
how intricate, can be exploited: lawyers set up tax shelters that evade the purpose of the rules.
Congress reacted to this problem initially by creating ever more complex rules, but eventually
trumped them with a standard that prohibited bad faith evasion of the tax laws.
The legal landscape is a complex mix of rules and standards, which often overlap.
Drivers must obey both traffic rules like the speed limit and traffic standards like laws against
reckless driving and tort norms against negligent driving. Indeed, one can think of traffic norms
as complex rules-with-standards—where there are apparently bright-line rules (drive under 60
miles per hour) that are subject to muddy standards (unless there is an emergency).
Medical protocols are just one more example of a choice along the rules-standards
continuum. The nurses Holmes describe follow a protocol that ensures that they do not use the
wrong blood in a transfusion. Doctors are instructed to clear the windpipe before staunching the
wound.12 And so on. These protocols, like the speed limit, reflect generalizations from past
medical experience. Delaying the blood transfusion is less risky than permitting only one nurse
to check the blood type. Letting the blood flow from the wound is less risky than leaving the
windpipe blocked. In the absence of protocols, medical practitioners may misjudge the situation,
or panic, or allow themselves to be distracted by irrelevant factors (the goriness of the wound
calls out for attention while the blocked windpipe is hidden). It is important to see that these
rules, like the speed limit, are mere generalizations, and in individual cases the generalizations
might be wrong. The patient dies because of the delay before the transfusion. Yet we instruct
medical practitioners to follow the rules because otherwise they are likely to make worse errors.
And yet as we saw above, legal rules inherently produce error costs, and it turns out that
medical protocols do as well. In fact, medical practitioners are permitted to violate protocols.
The reasons are obvious. Consider Holmes’ insistence that the rule “wash your hands prior to
performing a procedure” is unalterable, written in stone.13 Clearly, that cannot be the case.
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Suppose that, in the midst of an emergency involving a patient with a serious trauma, the staff is
informed that the tap water is tainted; or it is discovered that a patient has a rare allergy to the
only soap that is available in the emergency room; or, for that matter, the emergency room runs
out of a soap. Common sense (which is just the application of a standard—help the patient at
minimal risk to him and oneself) will tell the doctors and nurses to deviate from the protocols
when they clearly interfere with medical necessity. If they did not, they would be sued, and
rightly so. The protocols, like many rules, turn out to be presumptions, which may be overcome
by the press of events. That is why medical professionals are so highly trained; if one could
really treat patients by following algorithms, one would not need doctors who have vast training
and experience that supplies them with judgment and the ability to improvise.14
In sum, medical protocols, like rules, provide a valuable service by simplifying the
decisionmaking process at times of high stress, but, like rules, they unavoidably produce wrong
results if they are not applied sensitively. Usually, when the stakes are high, rules and protocols
create presumptions, but the decisionmaker is free to violate the presumption if circumstances
suggest that that the presumption is based on factual assumption that turn out not to be true in the
particular setting in which the decisionmaker finds himself.
C. Rules and Standards during Emergencies
I now turn to the bulk of Holmes’ argument, and make the following points. Holmes is
right to identify confusion about the nature of emergency; and it is useful to distinguish a ruledevelopment stage, which often but not always takes place prior to the emergency, and a ruleapplication stage, which takes places during the emergency. Holmes argues that at the
emergency stage, rule application should be controlled by protocol, so the executive does not
need (much) discretion; while at the pre-emergency stage, rule development does not need to be
rushed and secret, so the executive can collaborate with Congress. The first problem with this
argument is that, in fact, during the emergency one can follow protocols rather than exercise
discretion only if the emergency is the same as previous emergencies. This was not the case for
9/11, though it may be the case for other security threats (albeit with the proviso that protocols
are really just presumptions and it requires judgment to follow them). The second problem is that
the rule-development stage cannot always take place during normal times; in fact, 9/11 required
not only an immediate response to the newly discovered threat but the development of new rules
under the shadow of that threat. Those rules needed to be developed quickly and (for the most
part) secretly, and these exigencies limited the ability of Congress to contribute. A final point is
that Holmes ignores an important dimension of the problem: the difference between agents, who
in theory can merely follow rules and protocols, and principals, who cannot. The Bush
administration did in fact recognize the value of protocols and used them frequently; it just did
not apply them to itself.
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1. Two Concepts of Emergency
Holmes makes a valuable point, often neglected in the literature, that there are two
distinct phases for addressing emergencies—what I will call the stage of rule development and
the stage of rule application. As we will see, the two stages can run together, but conceptually
they are distinct. The rule application stage comes when the patient is on the gurney. The doctors
follow the protocols in the course of helping the patient. The rule development stage occurs
earlier. Someone must decide what the protocols should be. Someone had to invent the rule that
two nurses double check the blood type, and that doctors should unblock the windpipe before
staunching wounds—just as the legislature must determine the speed limit before drivers comply
with it and police enforce it.
We might use the word “emergency” to refer to the time of rule-application. As Holmes
points out, however, for the medical professionals, what seems like an emergency to a layperson
is not an emergency at all. They just apply the protocols that have been drilled into them, no
different from assembly-line workers. If this is what emergency means, then it is hard to
understand defenders of the deference thesis, who argue that the executive must be unconstrained
during emergencies. If doctors are constrained, why not executives?
But if we refer instead to the time of rule-development, reliance on the idea of emergency
seems even less appropriate. The doctors who develop emergency room protocols do not do so
under the pressure of time; they can do so at leisure. They can also do so in a large body, so as to
take advantage of the perspectives of many different people, and in public, so that all
stakeholders have a say. And so can the executive, the argument goes. When the executive
determines the rules that will govern the response during a terrorist attack, it does so in advance.
And it can, indeed should, do so in consultation with Congress and subject to judicial constraint.
The upshot is that executive deference is not necessary. During rule development, there is
no emergency, and so the executive, Congress, and the courts can collaborate in developing
appropriate rules that will govern during emergencies. They can do so openly, deliberately, and
slowly, with full respect for constitutional norms. During rule application, there is an emergency,
but the executive can merely follow the rules or protocols that were developed during the ruledevelopment stage. Thus, in the rule application phase, executive discretion is also unnecessary.
It follows that deference to the executive is also unnecessary. During rule development,
Congress has no reason to defer to the executive. During rule application, courts also have no
reason to defer to the executive, but should instead insist that the executive comply with the
rules.
2. Rule Application
Let us consider the stages in reverse order. We already have addressed some of the
problems with Holmes’ argument from protocols. Rules are seldom as bright-line as they first
appear. They often turn out to be presumptions which are themselves subject to standards (drive
under the speed limit unless there is an emergency). It is true that security threats, like medical
emergencies, often fall into patterns and can be addressed in partially rule-governed fashion.
Thus, when a gunman takes a hostage, the police follow certain rules: first clearing the area, then
7

making contact with the gunman, etc. Some officers will be given very simple rule-governed
tasks (don’t let anyone cross this line). But the rules quickly give out. Every hostage-taker is
different, and the most highly trained police officers will be given a great deal of discretion to
deal with the hostage taker, and to make the crucial decision when to use force. But even these
types of threats are simple compared to the scenario that opened up on 9/11. The government
knew virtually nothing about the nature of the threat. It did not know how many more members
of Al Qaeda were in the United States; what their plans might be; what resources were at their
disposal; how much support they had among American Muslims; what their motives were; and
much else. Protocols were worthless because nothing like this had ever happened before. (The
closest analogy seemed to be the absurdly irrelevant example of Pearl Harbor). The government
could not follow rules; it had to improvise subject to a vague standard—protect the public while
maintaining civil liberties to the extent possible. And improvise it did—instituting detentions,
sweeps, profiling, surveillance, and many other policies on an unprecedented (in peacetime, if
that was what it was) scale.15
For the rule-application stage, the deference thesis counsels Congress and the judiciary to
(presumptively) defer. Congress simply cannot set about holding hearings, debating policy, and
voting on laws in the midst of emergency. Either the problem will not be addressed, or Congress
will end up voting on a bill that it has not written, debated, or even read.16 For courts, too, the
alternatives are unrealistic. If courts enforce rules developed for normal times, then they will
interfere with the proper response to the terrorist threat, just as they would if they required the
U.S. military to comply with the Fourth Amendment on the battlefield. Alternatively, the courts
could insist on applying a standard, and halt executive actions that, in the courts’ view, violated
the standard I described above—protect the nation while maintaining civil liberties to the extent
possible. But here the courts are at a significant disadvantage. They do not have information
about the nature of the threat. They can demand it from the government but the government will
not give it to them because it fears leaks (to say nothing of recalcitrance caused by rivalries
among intelligence agencies). And judges are inexperienced in national security unlike the
specialists in the executive branch.
None of this is to deny Holmes’ basic point that protocols can be valuable. Indeed, the
Bush administration was as protocol-happy as any other institution. Consider the protocols for
interrogation which were disclosed in a leaked OLC memo:
In this procedure, the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench, which is
approximately four feet by seven feet. The individual’s feet are generally elevated. A
cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a
controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and
mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, air flow is
slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. … During those
20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of twelve to twenty-four
inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe
15
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unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately
relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated.17
So not even the Bush administration disagreed with Holmes’ argument that lower-level officials
faced with recurrent situations should be subject to protocols where they are appropriate. In this
sense, Holmes’ argument misses the mark entirely. The problem was not so much that protocols
were not used; the problem, if it was a problem, was that they were developed, modified, and
revised by the executive branch. This leads us to the question of rule development.
3. Rule Development
Recall that Holmes says that the argument that the executive can act more swiftly than
Congress and the courts does not apply to the rule-development stage because the crisis is past
even if the threat remains. But if we think back to 9/11, the problem was that crisis did not end
on that day even though the immediate threat of violence did. It was reasonable to believe on
9/12 that other plots had been put into action, and violence would erupt at any moment. As the
weeks and months past, these concerns faded but it also became clear that Al Qaeda had
sympathizers even if not always members in the United States, and these people might strike at
any time, possibly on their own, or volunteer for training that would later make them
considerably more dangerous. The anthrax scare brought home the possibility that Al Qaeda
could use even more deadly weapons than hijacked airplanes. Every day brought another
revelation of a hole in border security. Thus, it was a matter of urgency to develop new rules that
would address the threat.
The government maintained the confidentiality of a constant supply of intelligence, for
fear of exposing sources and methods. Meanwhile, the government was already taking secret
actions (many of which were later exposed), including surveillance of cell phone calls, tracking
of monetary transfers, and infiltration of terrorist organizations. Optimal policy going forward
necessarily depended on secrecy. Policy X, which might seem plausible given publicly available
information, may turn out to be unnecessary, redundant, or even counterproductive in light of
secret information about the activities of Al Qaeda or secret Policy Y. Thus, while Congress
could no doubt give useful advice, it seems hard to believe that it could have contributed much to
the development of counterterrorism tactics, any more than it can contribute to military tactics
(where to invade, where to bomb) during a regular war.
A set of constitutional protocols normally applies to the making of policy and its
embodiment in government action. The executive must act with, and through, Congress, and it
must respect the courts; it cannot act by itself. But these rules apply to normal times, and the
medical protocol analogy is of little use here. Medical protocols do not need to be secret because
patients have no incentive to game them—unlike terrorists who benefit greatly from knowing the
methods that the United States uses to spy on them, capture them, and interrogate them. And
medical protocols are not based on secret information; they are based on widely available
medical research. Thus, when medical researchers develop medical protocols at the rule
17
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development stage, they can do so publicly without undermining the purpose of developing the
protocols in the first place.
By contrast, rules governing counterterrorism operations must be developed mostly in
secret, and mostly on the basis of secret information. Hence the importance of keeping rule
development as much as possible within the only branch that possesses the power to act against
security threats. Those rules, of course, would constrain only lower-level executive agents, not
the executive itself. There is an obvious reason for this; if the rules are wrong, they need to be
corrected. It would similarly make little sense for doctors to develop emergency room protocols
that could never be changed in the future as new technologies and new health problems rendered
the old protocols worthless.
Holmes argues that the executive becomes subject to groupthink and other
decisionmaking pathologies when it makes policy itself rather than with Congress and other
agents. But the same point can be made about executive decisionmaking during regular wars,
when the risk of groupthink (if it is a risk) is tolerated because of the need for secrecy. An
argument could be made that secrecy is more important for real wars than for quasi-wars like the
conflict with Al Qaeda, but it is not clear why this should be so.
If Congress and the judiciary cannot constrain the executive during emergencies because
of the problem of secrecy, then perhaps this problem can be overcome by putting the source of
constraint in the executive branch itself, where norms of secrecy prevail. That brings us to the
Office of Legal Counsel.
III. Internal Constraints: The Office of Legal Counsel
In the early years of the Bush administration, the Office of Legal Counsel, which is an
office within the Department of Justice, issued a series of memoranda that argued that certain
counterterrorism practices—including surveillance of U.S. citizens and coercive interrogation—
did not violate the law. These memos were later leaked to the public and caused an outcry. In
2011, the head of the Office of Legal Counsel told President Obama that continued U.S. military
presence in Libya would violate the War Powers Act. The president disregarded this advice,
relying in part on contrary advice offered by other officials in the government.
These two events neatly encapsulate the dilemma for OLC, and indeed all the president’s
legal advisers. If OLC tries to block the president from acting in the way he sees fit, it takes the
risk that he will disregard its advice and marginalize the institution. If OLC gives the president
the advice that he wants to hear, it takes the risk that it will mislead him and fail to prepare him
for adverse reactions from the courts, Congress, and the public.
Can OLC constrain the executive? That is the position taken by many scholars, most
notably Jack Goldsmith.18 The underlying idea here is that even if Congress and the courts
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cannot constrain the executive, perhaps offices within the executive can. The opposite view,
advanced by Bruce Ackerman, is that OLC is a rubber stamp.19 I advocate a third view: OLC
does not constrain the executive but enables him to accomplish goals that he would not otherwise
be able to accomplish. It is more accurate to say that OLC enables than constrains.
A. Background on OLC
OLC is a small office in the Justice Department headed by an assistant U.S. Attorney
General.20 The OLC head is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, and is
formally a subordinate of the Attorney General. OLC is essentially an adviser to an adviser. The
Attorney General’s chief obligation is to give advice to the president; he typically relies on OLC
to produce that advice. But he retains the authority to disagree and disregard it if he so chooses.
In practice, OLC often gives advice directly to the president because the Attorney General has
delegated to it much of his advice-giving role.
Most matters that come before OLC are routine. OLC provides legal analysis of bills,
executive orders, and signing statements. OLC also plays an important role in resolving disputes
among executive agencies over legal authority. In most of these cases, the president does not
have any particular agenda, and so OLC can give honest advice without fear of retribution. In a
number of significant cases, however, OLC is asked by the White House to evaluate a proposed
action or policy that the president clearly seeks to pursue. For example, the president may seek to
launch a military intervention, and asks OLC for legal authorization. In these cases, the White
House may put pressure on OLC to rubber stamp the action.
B. OLC as a Constraint on the Executive
A number of scholars have argued that OLC can serve as an important constraint on
executive power. I will argue that OLC cannot act as a constraint on executive power. Indeed, its
only function is the opposite—as an “enabler” (as I will put it) or extender of executive power.
A president must choose a course of action. He goes to OLC for advice. Ideally, OLC
will provide him good advice as to the legality of the course of action. It will not provide him
political advice and other relevant types of advice. The president wants to maximize his political
advantage,21 and so he will follow OLC’s advice only if the legal costs that OLC identifies are
greater than the political benefits. On this theory, OLC will properly always give the president
neutral advice, and the president will gratefully accept it although not necessarily follow it.
If the story ended here, then it would be hard to see what the controversy over OLC could
be about. As an adviser, it possesses no ability to constrain the executive. It merely provides
this paper (that OLC serves as an enabler). See Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal
Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. F. 62 (2011).
19
See Ackerman, supra note __. For similar skepticism, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:
Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2335-38 (2006).
20
See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448 (2010) (and
citations therein).
21
This assumption should be uncontroversial; if the president seeks to act lawfully, then institutional constraints are
hardly necessary.
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doctrinal analysis, in this way, if it does its job properly, merely supplying predictions as to how
other legal actors will react to the president’s proposed action. The executive can choose to
ignore OLC’s advice, and so OLC cannot serve as a “constraint” on executive power in any
meaningful sense. Instead, it merely conveys to the president information about the constraints
on executive power that are imposed from outside the executive branch.
However, there is an important twist that complicates the analysis. The president may
choose to publicize OLC’s opinions. Naturally, the president will be tempted to publicize only
favorable opinions. When Congress22 claims that a policy is illegal, the president can respond
that his lawyers advised him that the policy is legal. This response at least partially deflects
blame from the president. There are two reasons for this. First, the Senate consented to the
appointment of these lawyers; thus, if the lawyers gave bad advice, the Senate is partly to blame,
and so the blame must be shared. Second, OLC lawyers likely care about their future prospects in
the legal profession, which will turn in part on their ability to avoid scandals and to render
plausible legal advice; they may also seek to maintain the office’s reputation. When OLC’s
opinions are not merely private advice, but are used to justify actions, then OLC takes on a
quasi-judicial function. Presidents are not obliged to publicize OLC’s opinions, but clearly they
see an advantage to doing so, and they have in this way given OLC quasi-judicial status.
But if the president publicizes OLC opinions, he takes a risk. The risk is that OLC will
publicly advise him that an action is illegal. If OLC approval helps deflect blame from the
president, then OLC disapproval will tend to concentrate blame on the president who ignores its
advice. Congress and the public will note that after all the president is ignoring the advice of
lawyers that he appointed and thus presumably he trusts, and this can only make the president
look bad. To avoid such blame, the president may refrain from engaging in a politically
advantageous action. In this way, OLC may be able to prevent the president from taking an
action that he would otherwise prefer. At a minimum, OLC raises the political cost of the action.
I have simplified greatly, but I believe that this basic logic has led some scholars to
believe that OLC serves as a constraint on the president. But this is a mistake. OLC strengthens
the president’s hand in some cases and weakens them in others; but overall it extends his
power—it serves as enabler, not constraint.
To see why, consider an example in which a president must choose an action that lies on
a continuum. One might consider electronic surveillance. At one extreme, the president can
engage in actions that are clearly lawful—for example, spying on criminal suspects after
obtaining warrants from judges. At the other extreme, the president can engage in actions that are
clearly unlawful—for example, spying on political opponents. OLC opinions will not affect
Congress’s or the public’s reaction to either the obviously lawful or the obviously unlawful
actions. But then there are middle cases. Consider a policy L, which is just barely legal, and a
policy I, which is just barely illegal. The president would like to pursue policy L but fears that
Congress and others will mistakenly believe that L is illegal. As a result, political opposition to L
will be greater than it would be otherwise.
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In such a case, a favorable advisory opinion from a neutral legal body that has credibility
with Congress will help the president. OLC’s approval of L would cause political opposition (to
the extent that it is based on the mistaken belief that L is unlawful) to melt away. Thus, OLC
enables the president to engage in policy L, when without OLC’s participation that might be
impossible. True, OLC will not enable the president to engage in I, assuming OLC is neutral.
And, indeed, OLC’s negative reaction to I may stiffen Congress’ resistance. However, the
president will use OLC only because he believes that OLC will strengthen his hand on net.
It might be useful to make this point using a little jargon. In order for OLC to serve its ex
ante function of enabling the president to avoid confrontations with Congress in difficult cases, it
must be able to say “no” to him ex post for barely illegal actions as well as “yes” to him for
barely legal actions. It is wrong to consider an ex post no as a form of constraint because, ex
ante, it enables the president to act in half of the difficult cases. OLC does not impose any
independent constraint on the president, that is, any constraint that is separate from the constraint
imposed by Congress.
An analogy to contract law might be useful. People enter contracts because they enable
them to do things ex ante by imposing constraints on them ex post. For example, a debtor can
borrow money from a creditor only because a court will force the debtor to repay the money ex
post. It would be strange to say that contract law imposes “constraints” on people because of ex
post enforcement. In fact, contract law enables people to do things that they could not otherwise
do—it extends their power. If it did not, people would not enter contracts.
A question naturally arises about OLC’s incentives. I have assumed that OLC provides
neutral advice—in the sense of trying to make accurate predictions as to how other agents like
Congress and the courts would reaction to proposed actions. It is possible that OLC could be
biased—either in favor of the president or against him. However, if OLC were biased against the
president, he would stop asking it for advice (or would ask for its advice in private and then
ignore it). This danger surely accounts for the fact that OLC jurisprudence is pro-executive.23 But
it would be just as dangerous for OLC to be excessively biased in favor of the president. If it
were, it would mislead the president and lose its credibility with Congress, with the result that it
could not help the president engage in L policies. So OLC must be neither excessively propresident nor anti-president. If it can avoid these extremes, it will be an “enabler”; if it cannot, it
will be ignored. In no circumstance could it be a “constraint.”24
23
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If the OLC cannot constrain the president on net, why have people claimed that OLC can
constrain the president? What is the source of this mistake?
One possibility, which I have already noted, is that commentators might look only at one
side of the problem. Scholars note that OLC may “prevent” the president from engaging in
barely illegal actions without also acknowledging that it can do so only if at the same time it
enables the president to engage in barely legal actions. This is simply a failure to look at the full
picture.
For example, in The Terror Presidency, Goldsmith argues that President Bush abandoned
a scheme of warrantless wiretapping without authorization from the FISA court because OLC
declared the scheme illegal, and top Justice Department officials threatened to resign unless Bush
heeded OLC’s advice.25 This seems like a clear example of constraint. But it is important to look
at the whole picture. If OLC had approved the scheme, and subsequently executive branch agents
in the NSA had been prosecuted and punished by the courts, then OLC’s credibility as a supplier
of legal advice would have been destroyed. For the president, this would have been a bad
outcome. As I have argued, a credible OLC helps the president accomplish his agenda in “barely
legal” cases. Without taking into account those cases where OLC advice helps the president’s
agenda ex post as well as the cases where OLC advice hurts the president’s agenda ex post, one
cannot make an overall judgment about OLC’s ex ante effect on executive power.
Another possible source of error is that scholars imagine that “neutral” advice will almost
always prevent the president from engaging in preferred actions, while rarely enabling the
president to engage in preferred actions. The implicit picture here is that a president will
normally want to break the law, that under the proper interpretation of the Constitution and
relevant standards the president can accomplish very little. So if OLC is in fact neutral and the
president does obey its advice, then it must constrain the president.
But this theory cannot be right, either. If OLC constantly told the president that he cannot
do what he wants to do, when in fact Congress and other agents would not object to the preferred
actions, then the president would stop asking OLC for advice. As noted above, for OLC to
maintain its relevance, it cannot offer an abstract interpretation of the Constitution that is
divorced from political realities; it has to be able to make realistic predictions as to how other
legal agents will react to the president’s actions. This has led OLC to develop a pro-executive
jurisprudence in line with the long-term evolution of executive power. If OLC tried to impose
constraints other than those imposed by Congress and other institutions with political power,
then the president would ignore it.

Morrison, Libya, supra note __ at 67-68. Still, the president’s freedom to deny Congress OLC’s opinion creates
some noise in the system, as it is always possible that OLC failed to give advice rather than gave negative advice,
and all this works to the executive’s advantage.
25
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C. Evidence
1. Testing the Three Hypotheses
We have three hypotheses about OLC on the table. The first is that OLC is an ex ante
constraint on presidential power, serving a role similar to that of Congress and the courts. The
second is that OLC is an ex ante enabler of presidential power. The third hypothesis is
Ackerman’s rubber-stamp theory that OLC serves neither as a constraint nor as an enabler
because it cannot say no ex post. In this section, I will briefly discuss the evidence.
It is easy enough to distinguish Ackerman’s hypothesis from the other two: if OLC never
or rarely says no, then Ackerman is right. In addition, Ackerman is right even if OLC sometimes
says no but the president ignores OLC in those cases.
Distinguishing the constraint and enabler hypotheses is more difficult. Both hypotheses
predict some ex post no’s. To distinguish the hypotheses, one would need to look at the other
side of the ledger: the cases where OLC has enabled the president to act where otherwise
Congress would have opposed him. Unfortunately, it would be hard to identify such cases.
2. Statistical Evidence
In a study of the written opinions of OLC, Trevor Morrison found that 79 percent
approved the president’s position, 8 percent provided a mixed answer, and 13 percent
disapproved the president’s position.26 In several cases, OLC rejected the White House position
on issues of significance. In addition, Morrison notes that since OLC usually provides negative
advice orally, the written record reflects a selection bias in favor of approvals.27
But there is less here than meets the eye. First, one must keep in mind that the executive
is a “they,” not an “it.” When the president cannot resolve policy differences among his major
advisers, he may well be indifferent about OLC’s reaction and indeed welcome a legal resolution
(“sorry, my hands are tied”). Second, the relevant focus, for the purpose of my argument, is OLC
advice on national security issues. On this topic, the consensus appears to be that OLC has said
no to the executive in only four cases in its entire history aside from matters that remain
classified: the rejection of the Bush administration’s argument that the Geneva Conventions do
not apply to terrorists in Iraq in 2002;28 the rejection of certain forms of coercive interrogation in
2003; rejection of electronic surveillance that circumvented the FISA court in 2003; and
rejection of the Libya intervention in 2011.29
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Even these cases turn out to be ambiguous. It must be recalled that OLC first said “yes”
on coercive interrogation and electronic surveillance, and then changed its mind a few years
later. In addition, OLC’s “no” on coercive interrogation turned out to be less than absolute: it
continued to authorize waterboarding even after the earlier memorandum was withdrawn.
Unfortunately, evaluating the empirical evidence is even harder than Morrison indicates. The
problem is not just that negative advice is confidential; the problem is that we do not know how
the executive responded to this negative advice. Did it desist from its conduct? Modify it along
the margins? Or ignore OLC? Maybe, maybe not.
A further methodological problem concerns whether a “no” blocks an important policy or
simply requires certain i’s to be dotted or t’s to be crossed. OLC officials often emphasize that
their job is to help the White House find a legally acceptable method of accomplishing their
aims. Even the early Bush administration OLC drew the line on certain forms of torture (such as
mock executions, the use of insects to exploit fears, etc.) and established guidelines to ensure the
safety of detainees. The problem with treating this advice as a “no” is that it is not clear that the
executive cared about these details, as opposed to the broad agenda of using coercive
interrogation practices. It no doubt wanted legal advice so as to minimize the risk of legal
liability.
Finally, as we have seen, President Obama ignored OLC’s position on the Libya
intervention. So in that case, OLC took a brave stand and then discovered that it had been pushed
to the sidelines. This major event offered unusually rapid confirmation of Ackerman’s claim that
the executive can avoid negative advice from OLC by soliciting advice from the White House
Counsel’s Office. (Obama also received favorable advice from the State Department legal
counsel.) Morrison argued prior to this event that the president faces strong disincentives to endrunning OLC.30 Afterwards, he could only criticize the president, claim he suffered from
negative political fallout, and hope that this sort of thing does not happen too often.31 However,
while the president was criticized, there is simply no evidence that his evasion of OLC has hurt
him politically. As is so often case, the (apparent) success of the operation provides its own
justification.
The upshot is that there is some evidence that OLC serves as an ex post constraint, but it
is fairly weak. Ackerman’s hypothesis seems too extreme, but it is hard to distinguish between
the constraint and enabler hypothesis. It is possible that OLC serves as a weak constraint or a
weak enabler.
Why has it been so weak? First, it may turn out that the constellation of factors that drive
decisionmaking in the executive branch prevents the president from solving a time-inconsistency
problem by using OLC. The president benefits from neutral advice, and from being able to cite
OLC’s approval, but when OLC blocks the president, short-term political considerations trump
the medium-term advantages of maintaining a neutral OLC. Meanwhile, OLC’s lawyers yield to
political pressure either for careerist reasons or in order to prevent the president from cutting
OLC out of the process. Private lawyers face similar pressures, but the market in legal services
might provide some additional discipline.
30
31

Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note __ at 1741.
Morrison, Libya, supra note _.

16

Second, the problem might lie in the nature of foreign relations and national security, an
area of action that has been notoriously difficult to bring under legal control. Courts have
frequently been asked to adjudicate disputes between Congress and the president in the area of
national security. Generally speaking, they have resisted these requests, treating these issues as
political questions or nonjusticiable for other reasons. The usual explanation for this resistance is
that courts are not experts on these issues; that the highly fluid, frequently changing nature of
foreign relations and national security makes them unsuitable for judicial resolution, which is
rule-bound, public, decentralized, and slow; and that, accordingly, courts fear that if they
intervene, their rulings will be ignored by the executive branch, provoking a constitutional crisis.
The supposed solution to this problem is to ask an advisory office in the executive branch
to take over a function that the courts have repudiated. It is true that a small office in the
executive branch can overcome certain problems that courts face relating to secrecy and speed.
But the fundamental problem is that foreign relations are not susceptible to regulation by rules.32
3. A Case Study: Military Intervention without Congressional Authorization
Given the inconclusive nature of the statistical evidence, one might also consider the
evidence in a qualitative fashion. In this section, I undertake such an analysis, focusing on
military intervention.
The executive has on a number of occasions sought to send military forces into foreign
countries without congressional consent. A lively controversy exists over whether the president
has such authority. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war. Yet founding
era sources suggest that opinion at that time was that the president could unilaterally use force in
certain circumstances—for example, to repel invasions. In the following centuries, the executive
has used force on foreign territory (rather than to repel invasions) on numerous occasions
without congressional authorization, which gave rise to the view within the executive branch that
tradition sanctioned the unilateral use of force even in foreign countries, albeit subject to illdefined limits. After the Vietnam War, which was widely blamed on the executive despite
congressional acquiescence, Congress passed the War Powers Act over the president’s veto,
which required the president to withdraw troops from hostilities within 60 days unless it received
congressional authorization.
OLC fought off these twin constraints on executive power. In 1991, President George
H.W. Bush order American troops into Somalia where they engaged in combat with local
militias. OLC resolved the constitutional question by arguing that the executive has
constitutional authority to send troops onto foreign soil in order to protect Americans and
American property.33 In 1994, President Clinton prepared to launch a military invasion of Haiti
after a coup overthrew the government, but the new government of Haiti backed down, and
American troops entered Haitian territory to conduct peacekeeping operations. President Clinton
did not have congressional authorization for the transfer of American troops onto potentially
hostile soil. However, OLC argued that the deployment of troops accorded with an
appropriations bill that barred the use of appropriated funds for military operations in Haiti
32
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unless justified by U.S. national security interests.34 The appropriations bill did not by its terms
authorize anything. OLC further explained that the president did not need congressional
authorization under the Declaration of War clause when “the deployment [takes place] with the
full consent of the legitimate government of the country involved.”35 Such an event is not a
“war” even if it could quickly turn into war. In addition, the War Powers Resolution does not
apply “where the risk of sustained military conflict [is] negligible.”36
In 1995, President Clinton decided that U.S. forces should enter Bosnia and Herzegovina
to enforce a fragile peace agreement. OLC found itself unable to rely on an appropriations bill.
Instead of citing a statute, OLC noted that the president has the “power to deploy troops abroad
without the initiation of hostilities,” citing historical practice and the president’s Commander in
Chief power, the much criticized constitutional basis for many Bush-era OLC opinions.37 In this
case the risk of sustained military conflict was not “negligible.” But that no longer mattered.
Because the parties had consented to the deployment of troops, there is still no “war” and neither
the Declaration of War clause nor the War Powers Resolution applied.
In 1999, President Clinton ordered a massive air bombardment of Serbia. Congress again
refused authorization; indeed, the bill to authorize military operations was voted on but failed to
pass on a tie vote. It was impossible to argue that the risk of sustained military conflict was
negligible and that the Serbs consented to the bombardment of their own country. OLC rested its
case on an appropriations statute enacted after the commencement of hostilities.38 President
Clinton sent American troops into action and then dared Congress to deny them funding.
Trapped, Congress reluctantly authorized funds. For OLC, the War Powers Resolution did not
stand in the way of the war because of the appropriations statute even though the War Powers
Resolution said that appropriations statutes do not count as congressional authorization.
During the George W. Bush administration, OLC took aggressive positions on a range of
issues, including the use of coercive interrogation (despite a statute that banned torture) and
warrantless surveillance (despite a statute that restricted surveillance).39 OLC opinions relied
heavily on the constitutional authority of the executive, using it to justify narrow interpretations
of the statutes. Subsequently, OLC withdrew these memos.
Let us now turn to the Libya intervention. In 2011, President Obama ordered U.S. forces
to participate in a NATO bombardment of Libya. Again, Congress refused to authorize the
action. OLC advised the president that he could intervene without congressional authorization,
citing its earlier opinions on military intervention.40 Two months later, in response to questions
34
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as to whether the intervention complied with the War Powers Act’s 60-day limit, the White
House released a document to Congress with a one-page legal analysis. Consistent with previous
OLC doctrine, the president argued that “the President had constitutional authority, as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct
such limited military operations abroad.”41 In addition, the president argued that the War Powers
Resolution did not require congressional authorization because the action in Libya was not really
a “war”:
U.S. military operations are distinct from the kind of “hostilities” contemplated by the
Resolution’s 60 day termination provision. U.S. forces are playing a constrained and
supporting role in a multinational coalition, whose operations are both legitimated by and
limited to the terms of a United Nations Security Council Resolution that authorizes the
use of force solely to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under attack or threat
of attack and to enforce a no-fly zone and an arms embargo. U.S. operations do not
involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they
involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or
any significant chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by those factors.42
The narrow definition of “hostilities” echoed the narrow definition of “torture” used by the Bushera OLC. The reliance on UN Security Council authorization echoed Truman’s reliance on
Security Council authorization for the U.S. military intervention in Korea (also not authorized by
Congress).43
Press reports later revealed that OLC had refused to issue an opinion advising the
president that the use of military force in Libya was consistent with the War Powers Act, and that
the president instead relied on the advice of the State Department legal adviser and the White
House Counsel.44
What are we to make of this history? One view is that it confirms the rubber-stamp
hypothesis. OLC has always rubber stamped legal interventions up until 2011; when it declined
to do so, the White House ignored it.
However, the rubber-stamp hypothesis raises some questions. One is why OLC would go
to such elaborate lengths to provide narrow justifications for military interventions in the early
years; and why it would finally draw the line on Libya. It seems likely that OLC sought to
prevent its credibility from eroding completely. An OLC which is truly a rubber stamp would be
of no value to the president and might as well be dispensed of completely.
At the same time, OLC could not in the end constrain the executive from maintaining the
military intervention in Libya. So if it preserved its credibility by rendering a “no,” it could not
41
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provide the checking function of Congress and the judiciary. The president’s decision to
disregard OLC’s advice is more in the spirit of the enabler hypothesis than the constraint
hypothesis: the president made what one hopes was a rational decision to weaken his hand with
Congress in future confrontations because he believed that the stakes were too high in the Libya
intervention to withdraw the troops. The gamble may well have paid off. The president’s success
in Libya in the face of congressional opposition may have the long-term effect of eroding the
War Powers Act rather than weaken the executive; in that case, the Obama acted wisely by
overruling OLC.
D. Alternatives
Despairing of both the traditional external checks on the executive (as intended by
Madison) and internal checks on the executive (as advocated by Goldsmith), Ackerman suggests
the creation of an executive tribunal that would have the power to review presidential assertions
of power and restrict such assertions when unlawful.45 Neal Katyal proposed vesting OLC’s
quasi-judicial authority in an executive branch official who enjoys more independence than the
OLC head currently possesses.46 However, neither approach solves the underlying problem that
has resulted in executive discretion. Because unanticipated national security emergencies call for
powers that cannot be stipulated in advance, the executive’s actions at such times are not
susceptible to traditional rule-bound legal analysis. Therefore, either the external official or
tribunal will honestly apply the law and end up interfering with policies needed to protect
national security, or he (or it) will enjoy de facto policymaking authority, which will not be
regarded as legitimate in a political appointee.
Conclusion
The medical protocol analogy does not provide any reason for doubting the deference
thesis. Rules are valuable in many settings, including emergencies; but it does not follow from
that observation that courts and legislatures rather than the executive should create and enforce
the rules. Each institution has specific advantages; the executive’s advantages are salient during
emergencies.
The notion that the executive can be constrained by its own components is a paradoxical
idea, and has little to recommend it. In the end, someone must have discretion to respond to
unforeseen events, and in the U.S. system that role has been given to the president. The theory
that OLC or some similar office within the executive branch could constrain the president rests
on a confusion between rational self-binding, which presidents may (albeit with difficulty)
engage in, and external constraint, which presidents resist. OLC may serve as a device for
rational self-binding, which extends the executive power; it is highly unlikely, however, that it
can serve as a constraint.
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